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I. INTRODUCTION 
The complexities inherent in an insolvency proceeding involv-
ing a debtor whose assets, creditors or business transactions tran-
scend international boundaries may prove insurmountable without 
the cooperation of foreign tribunals and a mechanism by which to 
address the varied and often conflicting rights of the parties in-
volved. Prior to 1979, applicable law in the United States was ap-
plied in a piecemeal and sometimes inconsistent fashion. 1 The 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code)2 provided a 
flexible means to achieve an economic and efficient administration 
of creditors' claims and debtors' assets in foreign insolvency pro-
ceedings, while recognizing well-established principles of interna-
tional law.3 Moreover, if implemented properly, the Bankruptcy 
Code provisions can effectively address the increasingly complex 
issues arising in foreign bankruptcy proceedings. 
Since the codification of the Bankruptcy Code, a surprisingly 
small number of courts have utilized the procedural mechanisms 
afforded parties involved in foreign insolvency proceedings. 4 The 
resulting decisions, however, have consistently applied the Bank-
ruptcy Code's flexible approach in determining the interests of 
competing claimants based upon the underlying policy of equality 
of distribution.~ More importantly, many of the decisions reflect a 
* Decker, Hardt, Kopf, Harr, Munsch and Dinan, P.C., Dallas, Texas; J.D., Syracuse 
University (1983). 
1. See Becker, International Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.BAJ. 1290 (1976); 
Becker, Transnational Insolvency Transformed, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 706 (1981); Morales and 
Deutsch, Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and U.S. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: The 
Tyranny of Comity, 39 Bus. LAW. 1573 (Aug. 1984); Nadelmann, Rehabilitating Interna-
tional Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by Herstatt and Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 
(1977); Riesenfeld, The Status of Foreign Administrators of Insolvent Estates: A Compara-
tive Survey, 24 AM. J . COMP. L. 288 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First 
Nat'l Bank of Boston, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977); Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976); 2 
W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ~ 304.01, at 304-2 to -14 (15th ed. 1985). 
2. 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1979 & Supp. 1986). 
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 304. Section 304 has no precursor in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See 
also H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, at 69-71 (1973). 
4. For further discussion, see infra notes 66-81 and accompanying text. 
5. Id.; see Israel-British Bank, 536 F.2d at 513. 
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judicial deference toward international adjudications, which at-
tempt to comport with the principles of international law. 6 How-
ever, several courts have acknowledged that the Bankruptcy Code 
does not provide the exclusive means to resolve the issues that 
arise in foreign insolvency proceedings. 7 Therefore, an understand-
ing of the options available to parties for obtaining appropriate re-
lief in foreign bankruptcies is crucial. 
This article will initially introduce and analyze the provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code that pertain to foreign insolvency proceed-
ings. The analysis will focus upon the definitional requirements for 
utilizing the relevant provisions, jurisdictional concerns, dismissal 
and venue considerations, guidelines for obtaining appropriate re-
lief and the scope of relief available. The article will next focus 
upon the implications arising from recent decisions which recog-
nize the non-exclusivity of the Bankruptcy Code provisions. Alter-
native means to obtain appropriate relief will then be considered. 
Finally, the article will conclude with a summary of relevant con-
siderations in utilizing the available mechanisms designed to ad-
dress the issues which arise in foreign insolvency proceedings. 
II. FOREIGN INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE 
A. ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS 
Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code implements the tradi-
tional accommodations extended to foreign bankruptcy tribunals 
by expressly authorizing a "foreign representative"8 to commence 
in the U.S. bankruptcy courts a proceeding ancillary to a "foreign 
proceeding". 9 An ancillary proceeding commenced under section 
6. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; Gitlin & Flaschen, The International Void 
in the Law of Multinational Bankruptcies, 42 Bus. LAW. 307 (1987). 
7. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 45-4 7. 
9. 11 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1979 & Supp. 1986). Section 304 provides as follows: 
(a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by the filing with the 
bankruptcy court of a petition under this section by a foreign representative. 
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, if a party in interest 
does not timely controvert the petition, or after trial, the court may-
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of-
(A) any action against (i) a debtor with respect to property involved in such 
foreign proceeding; or (ii) such property; or 
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor with respect to such 
property, or any act or the commencement or continuation of any judicial proceed-
ing to create or enforce a lien against the property of such estate; 
2
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1987], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol14/iss1/3
1987] Foreign Insolvency Proceedings 3 
304, however, is not a true bankruptcy proceeding with its attend-
ant benefits and burdens.10 A section 304 proceeding has a limited 
function - to aid in a proceeding pending in a foreign court.11 
Consequently, the procedural mechanisms for initiating an ancil-
lary proceeding and the remedies available differ substantially 
from a full-scale bankruptcy proceeding. 
According to the accompanying legislative history, section 304 
was designed to permit a foreign representative of a foreign bank-
Id. 
(2) order turnover of the property to such estate, or the 
proceeds of such property, to such foreign representative; or 
(3) order other appropriate relief. 
(c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this section, the 
court shall be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious ad-
ministration of such estate, consistent with-
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate; 
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and in-
convenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding; 
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such 
estate; 
( 4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the 
order prescribed by this title; 
(5) comity; and 
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the indi-
vidual that such foreign proceeding concerns. 
10. A case under § 304 is not a full-scale bankruptcy case with an automatic stay 
prohibiting dismemberment of assets by vigilant creditors or with avoiding powers given to 
a fiduciary, be it a trustee or debtor-in-possession, to ensure equality of distribution among 
creditors. See Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Serv. AB, 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 
1985). Rather, a § 304 case is a limited one, designed to function in aid of a proceeding 
pending in a foreign court. See In re Trakman, 33 Bankr. 780, 783 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); 
In re Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621, 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 324-25 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 35 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AoMIN. NEws, 5787, 5821, 6280-81; 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 1, 11 304.01, at 
304-2 to -14. 
"A chapter 11 case, on the other hand, gives rise to an automatic stay and, unless a 
trustee is appointed for cause, clothes the debtor-in-possession with the ability to avoid 
transfers which, absent bankruptcy, it could not otherwise undo." Kennedy, The Com-
mencement of a Case Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 4 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977, 1019 
(1979). 
11. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 456; see 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 1, at 304-6. "If the court 
grants a petition under section 304, there is no trustee or debtor in possession, and there is 
no 'estate' within the meaning of section 541. Therefore, none of the marshalling or avoiding 
powers under the Code would be available to the foreign representative." 2 W. COLLIER, 
supra note 1, at 304-6. 
The ancillary proceeding was conceived as a more efficient and less costly alterna-
tive to commencing a plenary proceeding which would be duplicative of a foreign 
proceeding. Congress retained the option of commencing a full bankruptcy case if 
the estate in the United States is substantial or complicated enough to require a full 
case for proper administration. 
Cunard, 773 F.2d at 457. 
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ruptcy estate, or the legal equivalent thereof, to file a petition 
under the Bankruptcy Code "in order to administer assets located 
in this country, to prevent dismemberment by local creditors of 
assets located here, or for other appropriate relief. "12 The provi-
sions of section 304 were designed "to give the court maximum 
flexibility in handling ancillary cases. Principles of international 
comity and respect for the judgments and laws of other nations 
suggest that the court be permitted to make the appropriate orders 
under all of the circumstances of each case, rather than being pro-
vided with inflexible rules. "13 
Section 304 simply provides a means "for the courts in this 
country to aid foreign courts and accommodate the increasing 
number of foreign insolvency proceedings having extraterritorial 
effects within the United States.m4 The legislative history clearly 
establishes Congressional intent underlying the drafting of section 
304. However, the application of section 304, although not compli-
cated, is often problematic. Therefore, a working knowledge of the 
procedural requirements and the mechanisms by which appropri-
ate relief can be obtained is critical to understanding the operation 
of section 304. 
1. Definitional Requirements 
Subsection 304(a) governs who may request the relief availa-
ble.16 To commence an ancillary proceeding, there must first be a 
pending foreign bankruptcy proceeding against a particular debtor. 
The initial determination, therefore, is whether there exists a "for-
eign proceeding" for purposes of section 304. 
The definition of the term "foreign proceeding" is contained in 
section 101(22) of the Bankruptcy Code.16 A "foreign proceeding" 
"is any proceeding, whether judicial or administrative and whether 
or not under the bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the 
debtor's domicile, residence, principal place of business, or princi-
pal assets were located at the commencement of such proceeding, 
for the purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by compo-
12. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 324-25; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 10, at 35, 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787. 
13. 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5821. 
14. 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 1, 11 304.01 and authorities cited therein. 
15. That subsection provides in pertinent part as follows: "a case ancillary to a foreign 
proceeding is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under this 
section by a foreign representative." 11 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1979 & Supp. 1986). 
16. 11 u.s.c. § 101(22). 
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sition, extension, or discharge, or effecting a reorganization."17 To 
understand the scope of this definitional prerequisite and the pa-
rameters for commencing an ancillary proceeding, other relevant 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code must be considered. 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, relief is available only to individ-
uals or entities not specifically excluded from qualifying as debt-
ors.18 The definition of the term "foreign proceeding," however, 
does not appear to restrict the application of section 304 to quali-
fied debtors. Therefore, the question arises as to whether an ancil-
lary proceeding can involve individuals or entities which otherwise 
would not qualify for bankruptcy relief, as the bankruptcy laws of 
many foreign countries often have less restrictive qualifying 
criteria.19 
Recognizing that the definition of the term "foreign proceed-
ing" in section 101(22) of the Bankruptcy Code refers to the domi-
cile, residence, principal place of business or principal assets of a 
"debtor,"20 the definition of the term "debtor" is controlling. 
"Debtor" is defined in section 101(12) to mean persons or munici-
palities concerning which a case under the Bankruptcy Code is 
commenced.21 "Persons" is defined to include individuals, partner-
ships and corporations, but does not generally include governmen-
tal units. 22 Based on these definitional provisions, it is clear that a 
foreign representative of a decedent's estate, for example, could 
not commence an ancillary proceeding under section 304. 23 Since 
the qualifying provisions of section 304 are governed by the Bank-
ruptcy Code's definition of the term "debtor," all individuals or 
entities otherwise excluded under that definition could not have an 
ancillary proceeding commenced against them under section 304. 24 
Section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code sets out who may be a 
17. Id. 
18. 11 U.S.C. § 109; see infra text accompanying notes 25-33. 
19. Id.; Nadelmann, Insolvent Decedents' Estates, 49 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1951). 
20. See supra note 18. 
21. 11 u.s.c. § 101(12). 
22. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35). That section provides, however, "that any governmental unit 
that acquires an asset from a person as a result of an operation of a loan guarantee agree-
ment, or as a receiver or liquidating agent of a person, will be considered a person for pur-
poses of section 1102 of this title." Id. 
23. It is well established that a probate estate is not a "person" within the meaning of 
the Bankruptcy Code. See generally In re Goerg, 64 Bankr. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986); In 
re Brown, 16 Bankr. 128 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981); In re Jarrett, 19 Bankr. 413 (Bankr. 
M.D.N.C. 1982); 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 1, ii 304.01, at 304-7. 
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1979 & Supp. 1986). This section determines who may qualify 
as a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. 
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debtor under the Bankruptcy Code and provides that, 
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this section, only a per-
son that resides or has a domicile, place of business, or property in 
the United States or a municipality, may be a debtor under this 
title. "H Relying upon this language, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia specifically found that there must be 
a "debtor" within the meaning of section 109(a) to invoke the 
court's jurisdiction under section 304. 26 
In In re Goerg, a bankruptcy trustee from the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany sought to utilize the provisions of section 304 to 
commence an ancillary proceeding in Georgia against a deceased 
and insolvent German national. 27 The Georgia administrator of the 
decedent's estate moved to dismiss the section 304 petition based 
upon, inter alia, lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 28 After a thor-
ough review of the relevant definitional requirements of section 
304, the Goerg court rendered its "unavoidable conclusion" that 
one must qualify to be a "debtor" under the Bankruptcy Code 
before jurisdiction will be exercised under section 304. 29 The Goerg 
court reasoned that "by not including probate estates as entities 
eligible for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, Congress deliber-
ately chose [the] state systems for disposing of property in probate 
estates over the national bankruptcy system provided for in the 
Code. "30 As a result, the court concluded that Congress did not 
intend to make an exception for foreign probate estates. Accord-
ingly, other non-qualifying entities under the Bankruptcy Code 
would be similarly proscribed from invoking the bankruptcy 
court's jurisdiction under provisions of section 304. 
The conclusion reached by the Goerg court appears to cor-
rectly apply the law.31 However, the decision left one question un-
answered. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on a report to 
25. Id. § 109(a). 
26. In re Goerg, 64 Bankr. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986). 
27. Id. at 320-21. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 324. 
30. Id.; see also In re Toga Mfg., Ltd., 28 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); In re 
Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Petition of Thunie & Roll, No. 80 B 
12058(RB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) , dismissed by stipulation, Nov. 24, 1981. Compare Angulo v. 
Kedzep, Ltd., 29 Bankr. 417 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (where a foreign company could qualify as 
"debtor" under Chapter 11, thereby meeting the threshold prerequisites for applying section 
304); In re Gee, 53 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (only the requirements of section 
109(a) must be satisfied in order to qualify for relief under section 304). 
31. See 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 1, at ~ 304.01, at 304-7 to -9. But see Gee, 53 Bankr. 
at 900. 
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the Judiciary Committee which seems to require that a debtor in-
volved in an ancillary proceeding must have assets in the United 
States. 32 This interpretation of section 304 could severely impair 
its value. The Goerg court, however, sidestepped this language and 
found that if the debtor either has its domicile or place of business 
in the United States, as required by section 109(a), the jurisdic-
tional requirements of section 304 are satisfied. 33 
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York found that the presence of property in the 
United States is not a prerequisite to granting relief under section 
304. In In re Gee,3" the creditors who controverted the initiation of 
an ancillary proceeding under section 304 argued that property 
must be present in the district in which the foreign proceeding is 
commenced, relying on a trilogy of early cases applying section 
304. These cases contained statements requiring a debtor to have 
property in the district in which the proceeding is initiated for re-
lief to be granted. 36 
The court first distinguished the ruling in In re Stuppel by 
the nature of the relief sought. 36 In Stuppel, which involved the 
commencement of an ancillary proceeding to recover property that 
purportedly was fraudulently transferred, the district court, in re-
versing the bankruptcy court's decision to dismiss the ancillary 
proceeding on jurisdictional grounds, held that the mere allegation 
of a fraudulent transfer was sufficient to obtain in rem jurisdic-
32. In re Goerg, 64 Bankr. 321, 324 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1986). The Judiciary Committee 
Report stated: 
This section governs cases filed in the bankruptcy courts that are ancillary to for-
eign proceedings. That is, where a foreign bankruptcy case is pending concerning a 
particular debtor and that debtor has assets in this country, the foreign representa-
tive may file a petition under this section, which does not commence a full bank-
ruptcy case, in order to administ~r assets located in this country, to prevent dis-
memberment by local creditors of assets located here, or for other appropriate 
relief. 
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978), reprinted 
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5821 (emphasis supplied); Goerg, 64 Bankr. 
at 324. 
33. See supra note 18; see also Goerg, 64 Bankr. at 324. 
34. 53 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
35. Id. at 897-99; see In re Stuppel, 17 Bankr. 413 (S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Trakman, 33 
Bankr. 780 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Toga Mfg., 28 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1983); see also Angulo v. Kedzep, Ltd., 29 Bankr. 417, 419 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (there must be 
property in the United States, rather than in a particular district, to commence an ancillary 
proceeding). 
36. See Gee, 53 Bankr. at 898. 
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tion. 37 The Gee court also noted that the cases of In re Trakman 
and In re Toga Mfg. both involved section 304 petitions in which 
the relief sought was a turnover of assets and an injunction pro-
tecting property. 38 Accordingly, in rem jurisdiction could be 
established. 
In addition, the Gee court reviewed the ruling in the Angulo 
case, which relied on Stuppel in support of its position, arguing 
that in Angulo v. Kedzep, Ltd.,39 the requested relief was discov-
ery.40 The Gee court held, however, that this case "cannot be read 
to mandate that in every case where discovery is the primary relief 
sought there must be a showing that there was property in the dis-
trict where the section 304 petition was filed. "41 
Instead, the Gee court found that as long as a strong nexus 
exists with this country and the particular district of the Bank-
ruptcy Court, relief is appropriate."2 The court concluded, "[g]iven 
that section 304 was drafted 'to permit courts to make appropriate 
orders under the circumstances of each case considering the princi-
ples of international comity', it is most appropriate that the judici-
ary not engraft onto section 304 a rule of jurisdiction so restrictive 
as to preclude the very flexible approach to international bank-
ruptcies which Congress sought to promote. "43 The Gee court also 
relied on the special venue provisions of section 304 which recog-
nize that jurisdiction may be conferred upon a bankruptcy court 
although assets of the debtor may not be present within the judi-
cial ,district. 44 
37. Stuppel, 17 Bankr. at 415. 
38. In re Trakman, 33 Bankr. 780 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Toga Mfg., 28 Bankr. 
165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983). 
39. 29 Bankr. 417 (S.D. Tex. 1983). 
40. Gee, 53 Bankr. at 898; see Angulo, 29 Bankr. at 417. 
41. Gee, 53 Bankr. at 898. 
42. Id. at 899. 
Since, as the 304 petition alleges, the debtor's corporate management, its legal coun-
sel and accountants are all here resident, some of its corporate books and records 
are here, it maintained numerous bank accounts here which were closed less than 
two years ago, and it may have other assets including its $10,000,000 share capital 
here, there is a sufficient jurisdictional predicate to allow discovery to ascertain the 
existence and location of the debtor's assets, including any causes of action which it 
may possess. And, of course, in arguing to this court that there is a sufficient nexus 
for the maintenance of a comprehensive chapter 11 case, Universal [controverting 
debtor] has necessarily conceded by implication that there is a sufficient nexus for 
the maintenance of the more limited bankruptcy case created by section 304. 
Id. at 898. 
43. Id. at 899 (citing Angulo, 29 Bankr. at 419). 
44. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1410(c) (1984 & Supp. 1986); see infra text accompanying notes 
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In rendering its decision, the Gee court correctly distinguished 
in rem versus in personam jurisdiction and their application to 
section 304. More importantly, the court recognized the practical 
limitations that would have been imposed on parties seeking to 
utilize section 304 if the court ruled otherwise. 45 Indeed, a contrary 
ruling could arguably have rendered meaningless the court's ability 
to order "other appropriate relier' under section 304. At a mini-
mum, however, the individual or entity against which section 304 
relief is sought must satisfy the definitional requirements of sec-
tions 101(22) and 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Section 304 also requires that a foreign ancillary proceeding be 
commenced only by a "foreign representative. "46 The term "foreign 
representative" is defined as a duly selected trustee, administrator, 
or other representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding. 47 
Therefore, a mere creditor of the debtor cannot initiate an ancil-
lary proceeding as a foreign representative. Such a claimant, how-
ever, may have other alternatives available to obtain necessary re-
lief in a situation involving a pending foreign insolvency 
proceeding.48 
Assuming that the definitional prerequisites are satisfied, an 
ancillary proceeding under section 304 can be commenced. The 
commencement of an ancillary proceeding does not, however, as-
sure that relief will be granted. Substantive protections have been 
incorporated into section 304 for both the foreign debtor and local 
creditors. 
2. Controverting and Converting a Section 304 Proceeding 
Under section 304(b), a party in interest may contest the com-
mencement of an ancillary proceeding.49 Unlike a full-scale bank-
61-65. 
The specially-created venue provisions for 304 cases found at 28 U.S.C. § 1410 and 
which are pegged to the nature of the relief sought in the petition buttress the con-
clusion that Congress envisioned the maintenance of 304 cases in which the debtor 
has a place of business in the United States but does not necessarily have any assets 
here. 
Gee, 53 Bankr. at 899. 
45. See Gee, 53 Bankr. at 891. This approach has been supported unequivocally in a 
case involving a foreign representative's effort to recover preferential or fraudulent convey-
ances, where the only asset in the United States was the property sought to be recovered. In 
re Metzeler, 78 Bankr. 674, 678-80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
46. 11 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1979 and Supp. 1986). 
47. Id. § 101(23). 
48. See infra text accompanying notes 87-102. 
49. 11 u.s.c. § 304(b). 
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ruptcy proceeding, any party in interest can controvert the initia-
tion of a section 304 proceeding. If the section 304 petition is not 
timely controverted, or after a trial on the merits, the court may 
then take various actions depending upon the relief requested and 
the facts of a particular case.60 When a petition under section 304 
is timely controverted, the bankruptcy court should first rule on 
the objections to the petition.61 Assuming the bases for contro-
verting the petition are insufficient to compel a court to refrain 
from exercising its jurisdiction under section 304, 62 the court 
should proceed to the next issue of determining appropriate relief. 
It is important to note, however, that in determining whether 
sufficient grounds exist to controvert the initiation of an ancillary 
proceeding, the court should also consider the provisions of section 
305. 63 Section 305(a)(l) permits any party in interest, including a 
foreign representative, to seek dismissal of suspension of a pending 
bankruptcy proceeding, provided that the necessary elements of 
section 304(c) warrant such action.64 However, only a foreign rep-
resentative, as defined under section 101(20), can seek dismissal or 
suspension of a pending bankruptcy proceeding under section 
305(a)(2).66 A court has wide discretion in determining whether to 
dismiss or suspend a case under section 305(a)(2)(B).66 Moreover, a 
decision under section 305(a) is not reviewable on appeal. 67 
Section 305 can also be interpreted to confer authority on the 
court to convert an involuntary case commenced under section 
50. Id.; see supra note 9 and infra text accompanying section IV. 
51. In re Egeria Societa per Azioni di Navigazione, 20 Bankr. 625 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 26 Bankr. 494 (E.D. Va. 1983), dismissed, 723 F.2d. 900 (4th 
Cir. 1983). 
52. See, e.g., In re Gee, 53 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
53. 11 U.S.C. § 305 (1979 & Supp. 1986). That section provides as follows: "(a) [t]he 
court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a case under this title, or may suspend all 
proceedings in a case under this title, at any time if, - (2)(A) there is pending a foreign 
proceeding; and (b) the factors specified in section 304(c) of this title warrant such dismissal 
or suspension." Id.; see, e.g., In re Gee, 53 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
54. Id.; see In re Gee, 53 Bankr. 891, 897 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). The requirements of 
section 305(a)(2)(A) and (B) are conjunctive and therefore both elements must be met. 
55. 11 U.S.C § 305(b) (1979 & Supp. 1986). 
56. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 324-25; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 10, at 35-
36. However, if actions have already been taken in a pending bankruptcy proceeding, the 
provisions of section 305 may become inoperative. A court cannot suspend or dismiss juris-
diction it has exercised over part of a case. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 325; S. 
REP. No. 989, supra note 10, at 35. For an example of cases where the courts have exercised 
their authority under section 305, see Gee, 53 Bankr. at 904-85; In re Trakman, 33 Bankr. 
780 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Bahamas Spas, No. SA-80-00096-PE, slip op. (Bankr. 
C.D. Ca., Feb. 25, 1980). 
57. 11 U.S.C. § 305(c) (1979 & Supp. 1986). 
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303(b)(4) to an ancillary proceeding under section 304, if the fac-
tors specified in section 304(c) compel such relief.68 It has been 
noted that a conversion from a section 303 involuntary case to a 
section 304 ancillary proceeding would be appropriate where few 
creditors in the United States are involved, the debtor's assets in 
this country are minimal, and access to and communication with 
the country where the foreign proceeding is pending is relatively 
convenient. 69 Arguably, the mechanisms for converting an ancillary 
proceeding should allow both the purported debtor and any party 
in interest to contest the action. 
Therefore, in determining whether to seek relief under section 
304, a party in interest must consider the interplay between other 
sections of the Bankruptcy Code. A claimant or foreign representa-
tive must also determine whether a pending bankruptcy proceed-
ing can or should be dismissed, suspended or controverted under 
section 305. An appearance by a foreign representative in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding for relief under sections 303, 304 or 305, how-
ever, does not submit such foreign representative to the jurisdic-
tion of any court in the United States for any other purpose.60 
Other relevant considerations that should be addressed are dis-
cussed later in this article. 
III. VENUE 
Assuming that the definitional prerequisites of section 304 
have been met, the next determination concerns appropriate venue 
of the ancillary proceeding. Section 304 has its own venue provi-
sions which are based upon the nature of the relief requested. 61 
Basically, if the relief requested is to restrain or enjoin the com-
mencement or continuation of an action or enforcement of a judg-
ment, venue lies in the district where the state or federal court in 
58. 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 1, ~ 304.01, at 304-6 to -7, 304-11 n.24. Such a conversion 
would be consistent with Congress' purpose to assure the most economical and expeditious 
administration of the estate. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 324; S. REP. No. 989, 
supra note 10, at 35. Cf. Honsberger, Confiict of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 631, 656 (1979-1980). Honsberger cites the factors for a bank-
ruptcy court to consider in deciding whether to grant a foreign representative's petition for 
relief under section 304(c). A court may dismiss a section 303 case and convert the case into 
an ancillary proceeding, order turnover of the assets in this country to the duly selected 
foreign representative, and impose conditions on such turnover to avoid prejudice against 
U.S. creditors. 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 1, ~ 304.01, at 304-6 n.24. 
59. See id. 
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 306 (1979 & Supp. 1986). 
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1410 (1984 & Supp. 1986). 
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which the action or proceeding is filed.62 If the relief relates to en-
joining the enforcement of a lien or the turnover of property, 
venue lies in the district in which the property at issue is located. 63 
Finally, venue for all other forms of relief is in the district where 
the debtor's principal assets or principal place of business is lo-
cated. 64 However, if a proceeding is commenced in the wrong dis-
trict, venue can be transferred to another district "in the interest 
of justice or for the convenience of the parties. "66 
IV. RELIEF AVAILABLE 
A. PRINCIPLES OF COMITY 
Under the provisions of section 304(b), there are several alter-
native forms of relief that a bankruptcy court may fashion if a 
party in interest has not timely controverted a section 304 petition 
or a pending bankruptcy is not dismissed, suspended or converted 
under section 305. In determining whether to grant relief under 
subsection (b) of section 304, a court is to be guided by one under-
lying principle: what will best assure an economic and expeditious 
administration of the foreign estate.66 The application of this prin-
ciple, however, must be consistent with six factors which are uti-
lized to determine what relief, if any, should be granted. 67 The six 
factors are as follows: 
1. just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such 
estate; 
2. protection of claim holders in the United States against 
prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such 
foreign proceeding; 
3. prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property 
of such estate; 
4. distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accor-
dance with the order prescribed by this title; 
5. comity; and 
62. Id.; see In re Banco de Descuento, 78 Bankr. 337 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987). 
63. Id. 
64. Id.; see supra note 44 and accompanying text. The use of the qualifier "principal" is 
troublesome. If the debtor's principal assets or place of business is not located within the 
relevant district, as in In re Gee, supra notes 34-43, the determination of proper venue 
becomes undeterminable. See, e.g., In re Metzeler, 78 Bankr. 674, 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1987). 
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1412; see, e.g., Angulo v. Kedzep, Ltd., 29 Bankr. 417, 418 (S.D. Tex. 
1983). 
66. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1979 & Supp. 1986). 
67. Id. 
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6. if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start 
for the individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.68 
13 
Section 304 is designed to give a court maximum flexibility in 
addressing the problems attendant to ancillary insolvency proceed-
ings. Most of the provisions of this subsection are self-explanatory, 
discretionary and fact sensitive. In many cases, however, the provi-
sions of subsection (c) have been interpreted to merely expand the 
principle of comity under international law when the court deter-
mines whether to grant "appropriate relief."69 That is, unless the 
other factors enumerated in subsection (c) are clearly compelling, 
the courts often rely upon the principle of comity in rendering 
their decision and fashioning appropriate relief. 
In the United States, the leading case on the concept of com-
ity is Hilton v. Guyot.10 In that case, the Supreme Court described 
comity as: 
[T]he recognition which one nation allows within its territory to 
the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having 
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the 
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its laws. 71 
Comity will be granted to the decision or judgment of a for-
eign court if it is shown that the foreign court is a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, and that the laws and public policy of the forum 
state and the rights of its residents will not be violated.72 The con-
cept of comity has been described by the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals as: 
[M]ore than mere courtesy in accommodation, comity does not 
achieve the force of an imperative or obligation. Rather, it is a na-
tion's expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard 
both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of 
persons protected by its own laws. Comity should be withheld only 
when its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the inter-
ests of the nation called upon to give it effect.73 
68. Id. 
69. See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text. 
70. 159 U.S. 113 (1895) . 
71. Id. at 164. 
72. See Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976); Kenner Prod. Co. v. 
Societe Fonciere et Financiere Agache A-Willot, 532 F. Supp. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
73. Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3rd Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972) (citing L. 0RFIELD & E. RAE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
736-37 (1965)). 
13
Wielebinski: Extending Extraterritorial Accomodations in Foreign Insolvency Pr
Published by SURFACE, 1987
14 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 14:1 
Under the principle of comity, it has been recognized that "for-
eign-based rights should be enforced unless the judicial enforce-
ment of such [rights] would be the approval of a transaction which 
is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the pre-
vailing moral sense. "74 
Based on these interpretive guidelines, the bankruptcy courts 
have usually applied a narrow focus to determine whether, in ap-
plying the principle of comity, the grant of extraterritorial applica-
tion to a foreign judgment would violate American law or public 
policy. The amount of weight given the comity factor under section 
304(c), however, can often overshadow the other factors enumer-
ated by Congress in section 304. 75 This does not appear to comport 
with the drafter's intent. Under section 304(c), the principle of 
comity is merely one of six factors that guide a court in granting 
appropriate relief. 76 Moreover, the legislative history does not indi-
cate that subsection (c)(5) is to be given more weight than the re-
maining five factors in balancing the equities of the case. 77 How-
ever, many courts continue to find that comity is the "most 
significant" factor to be considered. 
One of the misunderstandings the courts face in applying the 
principle of comity has to do with the vagaries involved in foreign 
bankruptcy proceedings. In contrast to the enforcement of a for-
eign judgment under principles of comity, a bankruptcy proceeding 
involves various interests, claimants and practical ramifications. It 
is well established that in granting comity to a foreign court's 
award of money judgment against a defendant, the foreign court 
must have obtained valid personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant. 78 This principle reflects and is in accord with our concept of 
due process that, in order for comity to be extended, the foreign 
court must abide by fundamental standards of procedural fair-
ness. 79 The rationale underlying the granting of comity to a final 
74. Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 13, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529, 
203 N.E.2d 210, 212 (1964); accord Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 
198, 202 (1918). For a discussion of the application of the principles of comity, see Reming-
ton Rand Corporation-Delaware v. Business Systems, Inc., 830 F.2d 1260 (3rd Cir. 1987). 
75. In re Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621, 629 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
76. See supra text accompanying note 68. 
77. See 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5821. Since the granting of comity is 
discretionary, the standard for review is abuse of discretion. Remington Rand, 830 F.2d at 
1266. 
78. See, e.g., Sprague & Rhodes Commodity Corp. v. Instituto Mexicano del Cafe, 566 
F.2d 861, 863 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Somportex, Ltd. v. Philidelphia Chewing Gum 
Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 441 (3rd Cir. 1971). 
79. See Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Serv. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 457 (2d 
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foreign judgment is that litigation should end after the parties 
have had an opportunity to present their cases fully and fairly to a 
court of competent jurisdiction.80 
The extension of comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, 
by staying or enjoining the commencement or continuation of an 
action against the debtor or its property, however, has a somewhat 
different rationale. The granting of comity to a foreign bankruptcy 
proceeding enables the assets of the debtor to be disposed of in an 
equitable, orderly, and systematic manner, rather than in a hap-
hazard, erratic or piecemeal fashion. Consequently, American 
courts have consistently recognized the interest of foreign courts in 
liquidating or winding up the affairs of their own domestic busi-
ness entities.81 Unfortunately, the provisions of section 304(c) seek 
to temper the interests of foreign courts and creditors with the va-
ried and often competing interests of similar parties in the United 
States. 82 Based upon this reasoning, the principle of comity cannot 
always be considered the most significant factor to be determined 
in a section 304(c) analysis.83 
Under section 304, the court is given certain specific factors to 
consider in granting appropriate relief. Recognizing the flexible na-
ture of those factors, a court must consider each factor on equal 
footing in order to make the appropriate orders under all the cir-
cumstances of each case. To rely solely on comity as the determi-
native factor is to return the to inflexible rules that precipitated 
the enactment of section 304. 84 
B. FORMS OF RELIEF 
If a court opts to grant appropriate relief under section 
304(b)(3), the type of relief may be both unique and far reaching. 
Obviously, the provisions of subsection (b) are suggestive of the 
relief available, such as enjoining enforcement of a judgment or 
other action against property of the foreign debtor, as well as a 
turnover of property. However, because of the broad language of 
Cir. 1985). 
80. Id. 
81. See, e.g., In re Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d 463, 468 (10th Cir. 1976); Kenner Prod. Co. 
v. Societe Eonciere et Financiere Agache A-Willot, 532 F. Supp. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); 
Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Serv., Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 
614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979). But see Canada Southern Railway v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 
539 (1883); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS, §§ 99, 386 (1971). 
82. See, e.g., In re Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621, 628-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
83. In re Gee, 53 Bankr. 891, 901 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); Culmer, 25 Bankr. at 629. 
84. HR. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 325; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 10, at 35. 
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subsection (b)(3) regarding "other appropriate relief," the courts 
have used this provision to mold appropriate relief in near blank 
fashion. 86 Recognizing that the application of section 304(b) is fact 
sensitive, clear guidelines on "appropriate relief' cannot be readily 
established. Examples of how courts have applied this language, 
however, may be illustrative. In In re Trakman, the court sus-
pended all proceedings to allow parties to uncover evidence of 
preferential transfers. 86 In a case out of the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia, the court decided in the affirmative that a preference action 
can be brought in an ancillary proceeding. 87 In another case, the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida creatively 
utilized section 304(b)(3) to appoint a co-trustee with authority 
over the debtor's assets and affairs in the United States.88 Finally, 
section 304(b)(3) has been utilized simply to facilitate discovery.89 
Therefore, it is obvious that the scope of relief available under the 
catch-all provisions of subsection 304(b)(3) is virtually whatever is 
deemed appropriate under the facts of each case. 
V. NON-EXCLUSIVITY OF SECTION 304 
The mechanisms contained in section 304 of the Bankruptcy 
Code provide both an equitable and flexible means to assist foreign 
courts having jurisdiction over a pending insolvency proceeding 
that involves assets or creditors in the United States. When an is-
sue arises in connection with a foreign proceeding, however, the 
provisions of section 304 are not the exclusive remedy available to 
the parties involved. For example, under the Bankruptcy Code, a 
foreign representative or any other creditor may commence an in-
voluntary case in the United States against a debtor involved in a 
foreign proceeding to administer assets in this country.90 
85. See, e.g., In re Trakman, 33 Bankr. 780, 783 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing Culmer, 
25 Bankr. 621). It is clear, however, that a representative of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding 
is limited by the powers available under the laws of the country where the foreign proceed-
ing is pending. In re Metzeler, 78 Bankr. 674, 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); cf. In re Comstat 
Consulting Serv., Ltd., 10 Bankr. 134 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Egeria Societa per 
Azioni di Navigazione, 20 Bankr. 625 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 26 
Bankr. 494 (E.D. Va. 1983), dismissed, 723 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1983). 
86. Trakman, 33 Bankr. at 784. 
87. Egeria Societa per Azioni di Navigazione, 26 Bankr. at 494. 
88. In re Lineas Aereas de Nicaragua, S.A., 13 Bankr. 779 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); see 
also In re Lineas Aereas de Nicaragua, S.A., 10 Bankr. 790 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (in the 
same court's initial decision, actions were permitted to proceed but parties were enjoined 
from enforcing judgments they obtained). 
89. See Angulo v. Kedzep, Ltd., 29 Bankr. 417 (S.D. Tex. 1983). 
90. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 322; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 10, at 33. 
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A critical distinction between an ancillary proceeding under 
section 304 and an involuntary case under section 303(b)(4) is that 
under the latter provision, an independent case under title 11 is 
commenced. 91 This independent case may be administered concur-
rently with a foreign proceeding.92 The benefits or drawbacks at-
tendant to such a proceeding depend upon the perspective of the 
parties involved. Normally, a local creditor would prefer the ad-
ministration of assets through a proceeding in the United States. 
However, the debtor is afforded additional protections under an 
independent case under title 11.93 In addition, the cost and ex-
pense of a proceeding under title 11 may be prohibitive. Even if an 
involuntary case is commenced against a debtor who is involved in 
a foreign proceeding, a foreign representative can move to dismiss 
or suspend the case under section 305.94 Similarly, the debtor can 
controvert the initiation of an involuntary proceeding and the en-
try of an order for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. 
In addition to an involuntary petition against a foreign debtor, 
the debtor may commence a voluntary petition under section 301, 
or may have an involuntary petition filed against it under section 
303(b).96 If an involuntary case is commenced, the debtor has the 
right to contest the petition under section 303.96 Moreover, under 
section 304, the petitioning creditor must demonstrate that the ele-
ments of section 303(h)(l) or 303(h)(2) can be satisfied.97 Similarly, 
the elements necessary to commence a proceeding under section 
304, including the existence of a pending foreign proceeding 
against the debtor, a foreign representative entitled to initiate such 
a proceeding and the presence of property within the district or a 
"strong nexus" with that district may be insurmountable.98 There-
fore, foreign or domestic creditors and parties in interest may be 
compelled to seek alternative avenues for obtaining appropriate 
relief. 
91. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. 
(1979 & Supp. 1986). 
92. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 1019. 
93. 11 u.s.c. § 303(i). 
94. Id. § 305(b); see notes 53-60 and accompanying text. 
95. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 1007. 
96. 11 U.S.C. § 303. Compare the provisions of § 304(b) which allows any "party in 
interest" to controvert a petition filed under section 304. 
97. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(l), (2) (1979 & Supp. 1986). 
98. See In re Centre de Tricots de Gaspe, Ltd., 10 Bankr. 148 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) 
(nothing precludes a foreign representative from seeking relief under either sections 
303(b)(4) or 304). 
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In addition to the various alternatives under the Bankruptcy 
Code, recent cases from the Second and Fourth Circuit Courts of 
Appeal have unequivocally established that when a debtor is in-
volved in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, section 304 of the 
Bankruptcy Code is not the exclusive remedy for a trustee or rep-
resentative of the debtor who wishes to stay or enjoin creditor ac-
tions in the United States.99 In Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd. v. 
Salen Reefer Serv. AB,100 the plaintiff-appellant appealed from an 
order of the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
which vacated an attachment Cunard Steamship Company had ob-
tained against the Defendant-Appellee, Salen Reefer Services, 
AB.101 
The court phrased the threshold issue as follows: "whether, 
when a debtor is involved in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, sec-
tion 304 of the Bankruptcy Code is the exclusive remedy for a 
trustee or representative of the bankrupt who wishes to stay or en-
join creditor's actions in the United States.m02 Answering the 
question in the negative, the court recognized that "it would have 
been eminently proper for the District Court to have referred the 
case to a bankruptcy 'unit' of the Court. moa However, even though 
the district court did not ref er the case, the court of appeals held 
that it did not constitute reversible error.10" 
We do not find in the statute or in the legislative history a clear 
Congressional mandate, either expressed or implied, that section 
304 was to be the exclusive remedy for a foreign bankrupt. The 
statute is not phrased in mandatory or exclusive terms, and the 
language of the accompanying House and Senate reports is permis-
sive. For example, both the House and Senate reports state that, 
'the foreign representative may file a petition under this section.'10~ 
99. See In re Enercons Virginia, Inc., 812 F.2d 1469 (4th Cir. 1987); Cunard Steamship 
Co., Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Serv. AB, 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985). Compare RBS Fabrics, Ltd. 
v. G. Beckers & Le Hanne, 24 Bankr. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (action commenced in state court 
and removed to federal district court; the district court suggested that the case should be 
handled by the bankruptcy court under section 304). 
100. 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985). 
101. Id. at 454. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 455; see RBS Fabrics, 24 Bankr. at 200; 28 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. (1979 & 
Supp. 1986). 
104. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 455. 
105. Id.; see S. REP. No. 989, supra note 10, at 35; HR. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 
324; 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5821, 6281; see also In re Enercons, 812 F.2d 
1469, 1472 (4th Cir. 1987). 
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The second case, In re Enercons Virginia, Inc., 106 could also 
have been decided on its facts. This case involved a foreign trustee 
for an Italian bankrupt creditor of a debtor who filed an action 
seeking declaratory judgment that the trustee had exclusive stand-
ing to represent Italian creditors and the disallowance of any 
proofs of claims filed by foreign creditors against debtor.107 Under 
section 501, proofs of claims may be filed by creditors.108 Creditors 
are defined in section 101(9) which includes a foreign trustee.109 
Accordingly, a trustee in the Enercons case could have simply filed 
on his own in the local proceeding and resolved the dispute. 
A hybrid result has come about from the cases in which the 
action involving a foreign insolvency proceeding is brought in the 
United States district court, which has original jurisdiction over all 
bankruptcy proceedings. Rather than transfer or refer the case to 
the bankruptcy court or decide the case on grounds of comity, in 
one case the district court fashioned equitable remedies based on 
the standards set forth in section 304. 110 To the extent virtually 
identical elements of section 304 were utilized in that decision, the 
case should have been refered to the bankruptcy court to allow a 
consistent application of the elements contained in section 304. m 
VI. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS 
Depending on the bases for involvement with or as a foreign 
debtor, and the nature of the relief sought, there are numerous fac-
tors that must be considered prior to invoking the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code. The primary issue is under what provision of 
the Code the necessary relief should be sought. A foreign debtor 
can obtain relief through a voluntary or involuntary petition in 
bankruptcy. As a result, a creditor in either situation will obtain 
appropriate substantive protections. However, an ancillary pro-
ceeding, for various reasons, may prove to be an attractive alterna-
tive, because the conversion or dismissal of an ancillary proceeding 
is available under section 305, and is the likely result. 
Under section 304, the primary question is whether the defini-
106. 812 F.2d 1469 (4th Cir. 1987). 
107. Id. 
108. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1979 & Supp. 1986). 
109. Id. § 101(9). 
110. See, e.g., Victrix Steamship Company, S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo AB, 65 Bankr. 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
111. See Norton, Lilly & Co., Inc. v. Cape Lines, Ltd., 75 Bankr. 8, 9-10 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985); RBS Fabrics, Ltd. v. G. Beckers & LeHanne, 24 Bankr. 198, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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tional prerequisites can be satisfied. Assuming the elements are 
satisfied, the second question would be the likelihood of a party in 
interest controverting the proceeding, or, in the event a bank-
ruptcy proceeding is pending, the suspension or dismissal of that 
proceeding. If the pending proceeding was commenced against the 
foreign debtor as an involuntary proceeding, a request for conver-
sion of the case may occur. 
The next determination is the type of relief being sought. Ob-
viously, the broad language of section 304(b)(3) could support a 
grant of virtually any form of relief that is deemed to be "appro-
priate." In addition, certain other forms of relief normally obtained 
in a bankruptcy proceeding are available. However, because section 
304 is not the exclusive mechanism to address situations involving 
a foreign debtor, other non-bankruptcy mechanisms for obtaining 
relief should be considered. 
Although the considerations listed above are by no means ex-
haustive, they provide a general outline of the primary concerns of 
the parties who may be involved in foreign insolvency proceedings. 
The dearth of the case law on section 304 makes a well-informed 
decision virtually impossible. However, the decisions to date have 
adequately addressed the parameters of section 304 and must be 
considered for guidance. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Section 304 provides a flexible mechanism to address the va-
ried and complex issues that arise in foreign insolvency proceed-
ings. If utilized properly, section 304 can assure that the adminis-
tration of creditors' claims and debtors' assets is done both 
economically and efficiently under the circumstances in each par-
ticular case. However, claimants and potential debtors must be 
cognizant of the limitations imposed under section 304 and its in-
terplay with other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, 
alternative means to obtain appropriate relief must be considered. 
Provided that the courts, in applying the provisions of section 304, 
do not rely solely on the principle of comity in rendering their de-
cisions, or give that principle undue weight, the mechanisms of sec-
tion 304 will allow the courts to consistently accommodate the in-
creasing number of foreign insolvency proceedings having 
extraterritorial ramifications in the United States. 
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ABANDONING THE DEFERENCE RULE IN ITC 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ANTIDUMPING 
DUTY LAW 
Kevin C. Kennedy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent law review article1 , I analyzed three opinions of the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in which the 
Court was asked to review administrative determinations of the In-
ternational Trade Administration (IT A) ·of the Department of 
Commerce under the antidumping duty law.2 I concluded that the 
CAFC accorded the ITA more deference than appropriate on ques-
tions of statutory interpretation, s a conclusion premised in large 
part on the Federal Circuit's unique status within the federal court 
system as an Article III court possessing exclusive appellate juris-
diction over international trade matters. 4 Given this status, I ar-
gued, little or no judicial deference ought to be given ITA an-
tidumping duty determinations involving decisions of statutory 
interpretation. 6 
In this article, I undertake a similiar review of three recent 
Federal Circuit opinions6 involving an interpretation of the an-
tidumping duty statute by the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC). In two instances,7 the CAFC upheld the ITC's statu-
tory interpretation of the antidumping duty law; in the third 
decision,8 the court rejected the ITC's view. In this article, I argue 
that in the two cases where the Federal Circuit sustained the ITC's 
interpretation of the antidumping duty law, the court conducted 
an independent review, notwithstanding its purported deference to 
the Commission's expertise. In the third case, Bingham & Taylor 
* Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. J.D. 
1977, Wayne State University School of Law; LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. 
1. Kennedy, Judicial Review of Commerce Department Antidumping Duty Determi-
nation: Deference or Abdication?, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 19 (1986). 
2. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677h (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
3. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 37-38. 
4. Id. at 33; see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1982). 
5. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 33. 
6. Bingham & Taylor Div., Virginia Industries, Inc. v. United States, 815 F.2d 1482 
(Fed. Cir. 1987); ICC Industries, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 694 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Ameri-
can Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
7. /CC Industries, 812 F.2d at 694; American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 994. 
8. Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1482. 
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Div., Virginia Industries, Inc. v. United States,9 the CAFC re-
jected the ITC's interpretation of the antidumping duty law, con-
cluding that the deference rule was not applicable. The result of 
these three cases is that the Federal Circuit has effectively aban-
doned the deference rule in its review of ITC interpretations of the 
antidumping duty law. 
Even though the scrutiny which the Federal Circuit gave the 
ITC's interpretations seem in my view more intense than that to 
which the court has subjected the Commerce Department's inter-
pretations of the antidumping duty law, certainly no more defer-
ence is due one agency than the other. On the contrary, of the two, 
the ITC is probably more deserving of judicial deference given its 
superior resources. In any event, as I discuss more fully, in recogni-
tion of the Federal Circuit's expertise in the field of international 
trade, all citation to and seeming reliance on the deference rule 
should be abandoned in CAFC cases treating either an IT A or ITC 
statutory interpretation of the antidumping duty law. There is 
only one "master" of the antidumping duty law, and that is the 
Federal Circuit. 10 Any other conclusion is nothing short of the tail 
wagging the dog. 
II. STATUTORY OVERVIEW 
The metes and bounds of the antidumping duty law have been 
described so well in the literature11 that I will only give the briefest 
of thumbnail sketches here. As presently enacted, the antidumping 
duty law is essentially the product of two statutes, Title VII of the 
9. Id. 
10. In Consumer Prod. Div., SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed Am., Inc., 753 F.2d 1033, 1039 
(Fed. Cir. 1985), the court referred to the Commerce Department as the "master" of the 
antidumping duty law. 
11. Readers unfamiliar with the statutory background should find the following articles 
helpful. See, e.g., Horlick, Summary of Procedures Under the United States Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Laws, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 828 (1984); Barshefsky & Cunning-
ham, The Prosecution of Antidumping Actions Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6 
N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 307 (1981); Hemmendinger & Barringer, The Defense of An-
tidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations Under the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 427 (1981); Potts & Lyons, The Trade Agreements Act: 
Administrative Policy and Practice in Antidumping Investigations, 6 N.C.J . INT'L & CoM. 
REG. 483 (1981); Barringer & Dunn, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties Investigations 
Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 14 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 1 (1979); Note, Adminis-
tering the Revised Antidumping Law: Allocating Power Between the ITC and the Court of 
International Trade, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 883 (1982); Note, The Trade Agreements Act of 
1979: Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Duty Procedures, 14 J . INT'L L. & EcoN. 63 
(1979). 
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Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 12 which substantially altered the 
former antidumping duty law,13 and Title VI of the Trade and 
Tariff Act of 1984,14 which made minor adjustments to the 1979 
act. 
The law, an international version of the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 16 is designed to prevent price discrimination between national 
markets. An antidumping duty proceeding typically involves five 
stages, 16 beginning administratively with the ITA, which is respon-
sible for determining the sufficiency of the petition and whether 
imports of merchandise are being sold in the United States at less 
than fair value.17 The ITC, in turn, is responsible for determining 
whether a domestic industry is being materially injured or is likely 
to be injured by reason of such imports.18 The ITC and the IT A 
each conduct a two-step administrative proceeding lasting nine 
months to one year, that results in preliminary and final determi-
nation. 19 If both agencies reach final affirmative determinations, 
then a duty is imposed on imports of the offending merchandise in 
an amount equal to the margin of dumping.20 The dumping duty 
12. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at scattered sections of titles 5, 7, 
13, 19, 26, 28, 31 U.S.C.). 
13. The Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, §§ 160-171, 46 Stat. 763 (1931) (codified at 19 
U.S.C. § 1202 et seq. (1982 & Supp. 1985)). 
14. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1986) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982 & 
Supp. 1985)). 
15. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). 
16. For a brief overview of the antidumping duty administrative process, see American 
Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 998-99 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
17. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673a (1982 & Supp. 1985). Merchandise is sold at less than fair 
value when the foreign market value of the merchandise exceeds the U.S. price for that 
merchandise. Id. § 1673. "Foreign market value" is generally the price of merchandise in the 
foreign manufacturer's home market. In essence, the antidumping duty law is intended to 
prevent price discrimination between the home market and the U.S. market. 
18. Id. The term "material injury" is defined as "harm which is not inconsequential, 
immaterial, or unimportant." Id. § 1677(A)(7); see Bello & Holmer, Recent Developments 
Regarding Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Injury Determinations, 20 INT'L L. 689 
(1986); Note, Injury Determinations Under United States Antidumping Laws Before and 
After the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1076 (1981). See generally 
Ablondi & McCarthy, Impact of the United States International Trade Commission on 
Commercial 1'ransactions, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 163 (1985); Minchew & Webster, Regulating 
Unfair Practices in International Trade: The Role of the United States International 
Trade Commission, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27 (1978); Leonard & Foster, The Metamor-
phosis of the U.S. International Trade Commission Under the Trade Act of 1974, 16 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 719 (1976). 
19. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1671d, 1673b, 1673d. If the Commission reaches a negative pre-
liminary injury determination, the entire antidumping duty investigation is terminated. Id. 
§ 1673b(a). 
20. Id. § 1673. 
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order is enforced until revoked. It will only be revoked when injury 
or sales at less than fair value have ceased, and it cannot be re-
voked for at least two years after imposition, absent good cause 
shown.21 
An aggrieved party may seek judicial review in the Court of 
International Trade,22 whose decisions may be appealed as of right 
to the Federal Circuit. 23 The scope of judicial review in antidump-
ing duty cases is whether the administrative determination is "un-
supported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law,"24 the same standard found in the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.26 It is the application by the Federal Cir-
cuit of the "otherwise not in accordance with law" standard of re-
view to ITC antidumping duty injury determinations which this 
article examines next. 26 
III. CAFC REVIEW OF ITC STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TIONS UNDER THE ANT/DUMPING DUTY LAW 
In three recent decisions, Bingham & Taylor Div., Virginia 
Industries, Inc. v. United States,27 ICC Industries, Inc. v. United 
States,28 and American Lamb Co. v. United States,29 the Federal 
Circuit was asked to review various ITC interpretations of the an-
tidumping duty statute. In the Bingham decision, the court struck 
down the ITC interpretation,30 while in the ICC Industries and 
American Lamb cases, the ITC's view was sustained. 31 
In Bingham, five unfair trade petitions, four involving allega-
tions of dumping and one of unlawful subsidization, were filed by 
an American trade association of iron construction casting manu-
21. Id. § 1675(b). 
22. Id. § 1516a; 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982). 
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
24. 19 u.s.c. § 1516(1)(8). 
25. 5 u.s.c. § 7-06 (1982). 
26. Although the three cases discussed in this article concern the antidumping duty 
law, the injury criteria are indentical in both antidumping duty cases and countervailing 
duty cases. Thus, my analysis is equally applicable to both kinds of proceedings. For two 
recent Federal Circuit decisions applying the substantial evidence standard to ITC an-
tidumping duty injury determinations, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 
F.2d 927 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
27. 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
28. 812 F.2d 694 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
29. 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
30. Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1487. 
31. ICC Industries, 812 F.2d at 700; American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1004. 
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facturers. 32 In its preliminary injury determiilations33 in the four 
antidumping duty cases, the ITC found a reasonable indication of 
material injury to the domestic light and heavy Iron construction 
castings industries by reason of less-than-fair value sales of im-
ports from India, Canada, the Peoples Republic of China, and Bra-
zil. 34 With respect to the countervailing duty proceeding involving 
allegedly subsidized imports of light iron construction castings 
from Brazil, however, the ITC found no reasonable indication of 
injury to the domestic industry.36 The issue for review was whether 
section 771(7)(C)(iv) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,36 required the ITC to cumulate the 
volume and price effects of imports subject to an antidumping 
duty investigation, with import of like products subject to counter-
vailing duty investigation. In rejecting the ITC's position against 
cross-cumulation, the Court of International Trade answered this 
question in the affirmative. 37 The CAFC affirmed. 38 
Writing for the Federal Circuit, Judge Davis began by conced-
ing that the language of section 771(7)(C)(iv) was not clear on its 
32. Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1483. 
33. In antidumping duty and countervailing duty cases, both the Commerce Depart-
ment and the ITC make preliminary and final determinations. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 
167ld, 1673b, 1673d (1982 & Supp. 1985). For a general discussion of ITC injury determina-
tions, see Mock, Cumulation of Import Statistics in Injury Investigations Before the Inter-
national Trade Commission, 7 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 433, 434-39 (1986). 
34. Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1483. 
35. Id. 
36. Section 771(7)(C)(i), (ii) & (iv) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by Trade and 
Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i), (ii) & (iv) (1982 & Supp. 1985), provides: 
(i) Volume.-In evaluating the volume of imports of merchandise, the Commis-
sion shall consider whether the volume of imports of the merchandise, or any in-
crease in that volume, either in absolute terms or relative to production or con-
sumption in the United States, is significant. 
(ii) Price.-In evaluating the effect of imports of such merchandise on prices, 
the Commission shall consider whether-
(1) there has been significant price undercutting by the imported merchandise 
as compared with the price of like products of the United States, and 
(II) the effect of imports of such merchandise otherwise depresses prices to a 
significant degree or prevents price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, 
to a significant degree. 
(iv) Cumulation.-For purposes of clauses (i) and (ii), the Commission shall 
cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports from two or more countries of 
like products subject to investigation if such imports compete with each other and 
with like products of the domestic industry in the United States market. 
37. Bingham & Taylor Div., Virginia Industries, Inc. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 793, 
795 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
38. See Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1483. 
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face insofar as the cross-cumulation question was concerned.39 
Judge Davis also noted that the ITC, as an entity, had never cross-
cumulated, although individual commissioners had aggregated 
dumped and subsidized imports in their cumulation analyses:'0 
Against this muddied backdrop of ambiguous statutory language, 
coupled with an ITC practice adverse to cross-cumulation, the 
court turned to the legislative history of the Trade and Tariff Act 
of 1984, the act which added the cumulation requirement to the 
antidumping duty law.41 The portion .of the report of the House 
Ways and Means Committee on section 771(7)(C)(iv) quoted by 
the CAFC in support of a cross-cumulation requirement stated: 
The purpose of mandating cumulation under appropriate circum-
stances is to eliminate inconsistencies in Commission practice and 
to ensure that the injury test adequately addresses simultaneous 
unfair imports from different countries .... The Committee be-
lieves that the practice of cumulation is based on the sound princi-
ple of preventing material injury which comes about by virtue of 
several unfair acts or practices. •2 
Relying on this paper-thin piece of legislative history, the 
court concluded that "the Committee's use of generic terms collec-
tively describing dumped and subsidized imports in the committee 
report ... suggests that the statutory phrase 'subject to investiga-
tion' was intended to require cumulation of dumped and subsi-
dized imports."0 The CAFC buttressed its conclusion with the ad-
ditional observation that the cumulation provision was placed in 
the definitions section applicable generally to antidumping duty 
and countervailing duty proceedings.44 To the argument advanced 
by the ITC that the court should defer to its interpretation of the 
cumulation provision,46 the CAFC responded that because the 
ITC's interpretation was neither longstanding nor consistent with 
congressional intent, no deference was due it.46 Unfortunately, an 
opinion which was otherwise a tour de force was marred by the 
court's irrelevant, and worse illogical, observation that Congress 
39. Id. at 1485. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5164). 
43. Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1485-86. 
44. Id. at 1486. 
45. Id. at 1487. 
46. Id. 
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had made no exception or exclusion for cross-cumulation,47 sug-
gesting that the absence of any reference to cross-cumulation es-
tablished the affirmative of the proposition, that cross-cumulation 
was statutorily mandated. 
In ICC Industries,48 a decision rendered less than two months 
before the Bingham case, the Federal Circuit considered two is-
sues. The first was whether an importer could be assessed with ret-
roactive antidumping duties because it knew or should have known 
that the imported merchandise was being sold at less than fair 
value.49 The second issue was whether the ITC was required to 
conduct a separate injury investigation for the period in which 
massive imports were occurring in order to impose antidumping 
duties retroactively.Go The court affirmed the Commerce Depart-
ment's determination that the importer possessed the requisite 
knowledge to warrant retroactive imposition of antidumping du-
ties, and further held. that the ITC was not required to conduct a 
separate injury investigation. Gt 
Most of the ICC Industries opinion took up the question of 
the ITA's conclusion that the importer had knowledge ofless-than-
fair-value sales.H With regard to the issue of whether the ITC was 
required to make a separate injury determination that massive im-
ports of the subject merchandise during the critical circumstances 
period were a discrete cause of material injury under the critical 
circumstances provision of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,Gs 
the court purported to defer to the ITC's interpretation of the an-
tidumping duty statute. H 
The importer arguedGG that the ITC was required to make one 
injury determination under 19 U.S.C. section 1673d(b)(l)(A)(i)H 
47. Id. at 1486. 
48. 812 F.2d 694 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
49. Id. at 695. The International Trade Administration of the Department of Com-
merce is responsible for this phase of the antidumping duty proceeding. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 
1673d(a)(3), (b)(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
50. ICC Industries, 812 F.2d at 695. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 696-99. 
53. "Critical circumstances" refers to either a history of dumping or massive imports of 
the merchandise under investigation of which the importer knows or has reason to know is 
being sold at less than fair value. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(e) (1982 & Supp. 1985). If critical cir-
cumstances are found to exist, antidumping duties will be assessed retroactively 90 days. Id. 
54. ICC Industries, 812 F.2d at 699. 
55. Id. 
56. That section provides: 
The Commission shall make a final determination of 
whether -
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and a second, separate injury determination under 19 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1673d(b)(4)(A).57 While in effect conceding that the importer's 
interpretation was reasonable, the CAFC summarily disposed of it 
with the observation that "it is not the interpretation made by the 
Commission. "58 After reciting the "judicial-deference-to-agency-in-
terpretation" litany,59 the court turned to the legislative history of 
the critical circumstances provision. There the CAFC found per-
suasive an excerpt from the House Ways and Means Committee 
report on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which highlighted the 
need for expeditious relief to domestic industries injured by mas-
sive imports of competing merchandise.6° Consequently, the court 
concluded, 
[t]he Commission's interpretation [of the antidumping duty stat-
ute as permitting one material injury finding to be used in both the 
critical circumstances and final injury determination phases] is 
consistent with the congressional goal of providing meaningful re-
lief to the domestic industries under the time limitations within 
which a final determination must be made.61 
Even though the CAFC appears to have based its decision on def-
erence to agency discretion, a closer look indicates that in fact it 
undertook an independent review, examining the legislative history 
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or 
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or 
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially re-
tarded, by reason of imports of the merchandise with respect to which the adminis-
tering authority [International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce] 
has made an affirmative determination under subsection (a)(l) of this section (19 
U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(l)). 
57. That section provides: 
If the finding of the administering authority under subsection (a)(2) of this sec-
tion is affirmative, then the final determination of the Commission shall include a 
finding as to whether the material injury is by reason of massive imports described 
in subsection (a)(3) of this section to an extent that, in order to prevent such mate-
rial injury from recurring, it is necessary to impose the duty imposed by section 
1673 of this title retroactively on those imports. 
58. ICC Industries, 812 F.2d at 699. 
59. See id. The "judicial-deference-to-agency-interpretation" litany goes as follows: 
"An agency's interpretation of a statute is to be sustained unless unreasonable," "an 
agency's interpretation of a statute is to be sustained unless plainly inconsistent with the 
statute," '-'an agency's interpretation of a statute is to be held valid unless weighty reasons 
require otherwise," and "an agency's interpretation of a statute need not be the only reason-
able interpretation or the one the court views as the most reasonable." Id. 
60. Id. at 699-700. 
61. Id. at 700. 
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for itself62 and reaching its own conclusion that the ITC's interpre-
tation was reasonable. 63 
The third CAFC decision, American Lamb Co. v. United 
States,64 laid to rest an issue that had long plagued the ITC in 
litigation before the Court of International Trade:65 whether it was 
permissible for the ITC to weigh all conflicting evidence in its pre-
liminary injury determinations.66 This practice of the ITC, in effect 
since 1974,67 was rejected by the Court of International Trade.68 
The domestic industry objected to this practice, in the main, be-
cause it resulted in more negative preliminary injury determina-
tions than would otherwise have been the case. 69 The Federal Cir-
cuit accepted the ITC's view.70 
In making its preliminary injury determination, the ITC is di-
rected to make a determination "based upon the best information 
available to it at the time of the determination, of whether there is 
a reasonable indication"71 that a domestic industry is being materi-
ally injured by reason of the imports subject to investigation. After 
invoking the obligatory "judicial-deference-to-agency-interpreta-
tion" litany,72 the CAFC found the ITC's 12-year interpretation to 
be within the antidumping duty statutory framework,73 particu-
larly given the Commission's requirement that before an investiga-
tion is terminated at the preliminary stage, the record as a whole 
must contain clear and convincing evidence that no material injury 
exists. 74 The Federal Circuit pointed out the absurdity of any other 
interpretation: 
[T]he notion that allegations in a petition found unsupportable be-
cause of overwhelming contradictory evidence should nonetheless 
62. See id. at 699-700. 
63. See id. at 700. 
64. 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
65. See Jeanette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 123 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1985); Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). 
66. American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 997. 
67. See id. at 999. 
68. See Jeanette Sheet Glass, 607 F. Supp. at 123; Republic Steel, 591 F. Supp. at 640. 
69. By precluding the ITC from considering any evidence negating allegations of mate-
rial injury at the preliminary injury stage, affirmative preliminary determinations would re-
sult whenever information accompanying the petition raised the possibility of material in-
jury. See American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1001. A negative preliminary injury determination 
terminates an antidumping duty proceeding. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
70. American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1001. 
71. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a). 
72. See American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1001. 
73. Id. 
74. 19 u.s.c. § 1673d(b) (1982). 
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result in a full investigation and potential imposition of provisional 
remedies is directly contrary to Congress' intent ... of eliminating 
"unnecessary and costly investigations" and the "impediment to 
trade" that would reside in an unwarranted imposition of provi-
sional remedies. 76 
Through a process of gathering and considering all available 
evidence within the 45-day preliminary injury investigation period, 
the CAFC concluded that this legislative purpose would be effectu-
ated. 76 Thus, while purporting to defer to agency statutory inter-
pretation, the court in American Lamb again conducted an inde-
pendent review of the legislative history, satisfying itself that the 
ITC's interpretation was consistent with congressional intent 
before approving the agency's view. 
At first blush, these three decisions appear to be run-of-the-
mill administrative law cases. The ICC Industries and American 
Lamb opinions both echo the standard . rules regarding judicial def-
erence to agency interpretations of the statute which the agency is 
charged with administering. Even the Bingham opinion acknowl-
edged that ordinarily deference is due an agency's statutory inter-
pretation. 77 Given the wealth of Supreme Court decisions that are 
the foundation for the deference rule,78 these three Federal Circuit 
cases certainly are in the mainstream. However, the deference rule 
and its rationale that the expert agency view on the subject ought 
to be followed by the judiciary are not immutable shibboleths. The 
Supreme Court itself has recognized that expert discretion has its 
limits. "Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative 
process," the Court has acknowledged, "but unless we make the 
requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, ex-
75. American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1004 (quoting S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 
171, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7308). 
76. Id. 
77. See Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1487. 
78. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S. Ct. 
2778, 2782 (1984); United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565 (1982); Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 443, 451 (1978); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 
426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 29.16, at 400 (1978); R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND PROCESS § 7.7, at 405-07 (1985) [hereinafter PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL]; Levin, Fed-
eral Scope-of-Review Standards: A Preliminary Restatement, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 97 
(1985); Boudreau, To Defer or Not to Defer: The Question for the D.C. Circuit in Reviewing 
FCC Decisions 36 FED. CoM. L.J. 293 (1984); Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Adminis-
trative Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 587 (1984); Pierce & Shapiro, 
Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REv. 1175 (1981); Woodward & 
Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 329 
(1979) [hereinafter Woodward & Levin]. 
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pertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster 
which rules with no practical limits on its discretion. "79 Thus, 
agency discretion is far short of unbridled. As the Court has noted, 
"[t]he deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to 
slip into judicial inertia. "80 In international trade litigation before 
the Federal Circuit, the force of the deference rule is especially 
weak and should be abandoned in cases involving issues of agency 
statutory interpretation. 
IV. ABANDONING DEFERENCE IN CAFC REVIEW OF 
ITC STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS 
Review by the Federal Circuit of ITC interpretations of the 
antidumping duty statute differs little in form from appellate re-
view of agency decisions currently conducted by the other 12 
courts of appeals. 81 The standard of review of agency decisions 
contained in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,82 and codified in 
the Administrative Procedure Act,83 is whether the agency's deci-
sion is supported by the substantial evidence on the record or is 
otherwise in accordance with law.84 This standard, however; tells 
reviewing . courts little of the process to be followed ·in applying it 
to a given case. 
While the Federal Circuit and the other courts of appeals use 
the same standard of review when reviewing agency action, the un-
usual element in CAFC review is that ITC antidumping duty de-
terminations come to the Federal Circuit only after they have been 
reviewed first by the Court of International Trade. 86 Even though 
79. Burlington Truck Lines v United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962) (emphasis in 
original). 
80. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 271 
(1968). 
81. These courts have reviewed agency determinations from the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (see 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982)); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (see 28 
U.S.C § 2342(4) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1982)); the Interstate Commerce Commission (see 
28 U.S.C. §2321 (1982)); or the Federal Communications Commission (see 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) 
(1982); 28 u.s.c. § 2342(2) (1982)). 
82. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). In that case, Justice Frankfurter· candidly noted the unavoid-
able role that judicial discretion plays in the review of agency action: 
A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for certi-
tude but cannot assure certainty of application. Some scope for judicial discretion 
in applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual process of judg-
ing or by using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry. 
Id. at 488-89. 
83. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1982). 
84. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
85. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(c), 2640(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985); 19 U.S.C. §§ 
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judicial scrutiny of antidumping duty determinations has been 
doubled, paradoxically the CAFC treats antidumping duty and 
countervailing duty appeals essentially as if the Court of Interna-
tional Trade had never initially reviewed the matter. In Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co. v. United States,86 the Federal Cir-
cuit was called upon to review an antidumping duty order 
revocation proceeding conducted by the ITC. The threshold ques-
tion addressed by the CAFC was whether "in reviewing determina-
tions of injury or likelihood of injury in antidumping cases, we re-
view the Court's [Court of International Trade's] decision to 
determine if it is based on a fair assessment of the record . . . or 
whether we directly review the determination of the Commission 
• • • • "
87 The court gave the following answer: 
There is no question but that under our jurisdictional statute 
it is the Court's decision that is °before us .... However, resolution 
of whether the Court correctly held that the Commission's decision 
was not supported by the substantial evidence requires considera-
tion of the evidence presented to and the analysis by the Commis-
sion. Thus, to determine whether the Court correctly applied the 
statutory standard of [review], we must review the Commission's 
decision .... Only if we agree with the lower court's conclusion on 
this initial question would we reach the question whether the court 
properly disposed of the case by reversal, rather than remand.88 
Thus, the Federal Circuit reviews an ITC determination virtually 
as if no review had taken place at the Court of International 
Trade.89 
The wisdom of having this additional layer of judicial review 
in light of the attendant delay and cost is questionable.90 More im-
1516a(a)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) & 1516a(b). See generally Note, Administering the Revised An-
tidumping Law: Allocating Power between the ITC and the Court of International Trade, 
22 VA. J . INT'L L. 883 (1982). 
86. 750 F.2d 927 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
87. Id. at 932 (emphasis in original). 
88. Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). 
89. See Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
("We review that court's review of an ITC determination by applying anew the statute's 
express judicial review standard."). 
90. Kennedy, A Proposal to Abolish the U.S . Court of International Trade, 4 DICK. J. 
INT'L L. 13, 22 (1985). In 1983, a bill was introduced in the Senate to repeal the jurisdiction 
of the Court of International Trade in antidumping duty and countervailing duty cases. S. 
1672, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 10,755-57 (1983). The bill was designed to reduce 
litigation expense and delay in antidumping duty and countervailing duty appeals. As noted 
in the fact sheet accompanying the bill: 
Under current law, the U.S. Court of International Trade is the court for review 
of AD/CVD cases. The bill would assign this responsibility to the Court of Appeals 
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portantly and pertinent in the present context, however, is that if 
Congress genuinely intended for the courts to defer to the determi-
nations of the ITC, granting litigants two opportunities to appeal 
such determinations to the Federal judiciary as a matter of right 
- one opportunity more than is typically the case in administra-
tive law cases - would seem inconsistent with this intent. If ITC 
determinations, and for that matter, IT A determinations as well, 
are entitled to great judicial deference, why expose such determi-
nations twice to the gauntlet of judicial review? At least one an-
swer, of course, is that Congress did not believe that deference was 
due to such determinations because of an apprehension that politi-
cal considerations might shape them. By screening these determi-
nations through the courts twice, the administering agencies would 
be on notice that if extralegal considerations enter into a determi-
nation, that determination runs a substantial risk of ultimately be-
ing reversed. A fair inference from this two layer scheme of judicial 
review is that Congress is not convinced that ITA and ITC anti-
dumping determinations should be shielded from intense judicial 
probing. 
Although it can only be inferred from this dual judicial review 
scheme that Congress intended little or no deference be accorded 
ITC determinations, a more explicit congressional pronouncement 
found in the legislative history of the Customs Courts Act of 
1980,91 substantially undercuts the "agency expertise" rationale for 
for the Federal Circuit. 
AD/CVD cases are currently subject to a two-step appeals process, in which 
determinations are first appealed to the Court of International Trade and then to 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The only function of the courts in 
these cases is to conduct an appellate review of the agency proceedings. By elimi-
nating the first step in the process, the bill brings the import relief area into con-
formity with the usual administrative practice and reduces the costs associated with 
appellate review by two different courts. 
129 CONG. REC. 10,757 (1983). The Senate bill was deleted from the final version of the 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. 
91. Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). The Customs Courts Act of 1980 was chiefly designed to clarify and enlarge the 
jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade. See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1, 19-20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3729. See generally Co-
hen, Recent Decisions of the Court of International Trade Relating to Jurisdiction: A Pri-
mer and a Critique, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 700 (1984); Vance, The Unrealized Jurisdiction 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (i) : A View from the Plaintiff's Bar, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 793 (1984); 
Cohen, The "Residual Jurisdiction" of the Court of International Trade Under the Cus-
toms Courts Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REV. 471 (1981); Rodino, The Customs Courts 
Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REV. 459 (1981). 
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judicial deference. In the House Report92 on that 1980 Act, re-
peated reference was made to the "specialized expertise"93 of the 
Federal Circuit in international trade litigation: 
The Customs Courts Act of 1980 creates a comprehensive system 
of judicial review of civil actions arising from import transactions, 
utilizing the specialized expertise of the United States Customs 
Court [the predecessor court of the Court of International Trade] 
and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
[which was merged with the Court of Claims in 1982 to form the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit].9" 
In addition, in listing the major goals of the Customs Courts 
Act, the House Report emphasized "Congress' intent that the ex-
pertise [of the Court of International Trade and the Federal Cir-
cuit] be exclusively utilized in the resolution of conflicts and dis-
putes arising out of the tariff and international trade laws . . .. "96 
Thus, given Congress' explicit recognition of the CAFC's special 
expertise in international trade matters, it is highly debatable 
whether the Federal Circuit should show any deference to the ITC 
in cases of statutory interpretation. 
Although the CAFC stated in these three cases that deference 
is due to ITC interpretations of the antidumping duty law, does 
the Federal Circuit in fact defer? Posing the questions somewhat 
differently, would the results have differed in the three cases under 
discussion if the CAFC had reviewed the ITC determinations using 
a "no deference even if sufficiently reasonable" standard of review? 
V. THE "NO DEFERENCE" STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Bingham, the Federal Circuit concluded that the ITC's in-
terpretation of the cumulation provision of the Trade and Tariff 
Act of 1984 was directly a~ odds with congressional intent regard-
ing the issue of cross-cumulation.96 The court consequently had no 
difficulty rejecting the ITC's view in favor of one which it consid-
ered to be congruous with what Congress intended. Had there been 
a longstanding agency practice on the cross-cumulation question, 
the case might have been closer. Given that there was none,97 the 
92. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 91. 
93. Id. at 20. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 28. 
96. Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1487. 
97. See id. 
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CAFC was not put to any hard choices. But even had there been 
such a practice, the court in all likelihood would have still rejected 
the ITC's position because it would have run counter to the Fed-
eral Circuit's reading of the objective of the cumulation provision 
as revealed in the legislative history.98 In short, because the CAFC 
found the ITC's statutory interpretation to be unreasonable, there 
would have been no opportunity to apply a "no deference even if 
sufficiently reasonable" standard of review. 
In ICC Industries, the court in effect conceded that the im-
porters' interpretation of the critical circumstances statute was 
reasonable.99 Although the CAFC recited the "judicial-deference-
to-agency-interpretation" boilerplate,100 its acceptance of the ITC's 
interpretation seems less predicated on deference to agency action 
than on that interpretation's consistency with congressional in-
tent. 101 The legislative history available was scant, but it did never-
theless support the ITC's position for ·prompt relief. Thus, the 
Federal Circuit was not writing on a clean slate but rather had 
some legislative history, albeit meager, to guide it through the stat-
utory shoals. On balance, while the ICC Industries case might have 
been closer had a no deference standard of review been applied, 
the result would have probably been the same. 
Finally, in American Lamb, the court was placed in the posi-
tion of having to vacate the decision of the Court of International 
Trade in order to uphold the ITC's interpretation of the anti-
dumping duty statute, unlike in Bingham and ICC Industries, 
where the CAFC affirmed the Court of International Trade. fur-
thermore, the court in American Lamb had to vacate a lower court 
decision whose reasoning was "fully acceptable."102 Once again, 
however, what was decisive for the CAFC in upholding the ITC's 
view in American Lamb, as it was in sustaining that view in ICC 
Industries and rejecting it in Bingham, was congressional intent: 
Congress' requirement that ITC conduct a thorough investigation, 
using the best information available to it, Congress' expectation of 
opportunity for interested parties to present their views, and Con-
gress' provision of the "reasonable indication" standard for use in 
investigations initiated in response to a petition and in ITC's self-
98. See id. 
99. ICC Industries, 812 F.2d at 699 (where the court stated that the importers' view 
"may be one of the possible interpretations"). 
100. Id. 
101. See id. at 699-700. 
102. See American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1001. 
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initiated investigations - all militate against a view that Congress 
intended ITC to disregard evidence that clearly and convincingly 
refutes the allegations in a petition. 103 
The Federal Circuit added that the Court of International 
Trade's reading of "reasonable indication" of injury (as being sy-
nonymous with "mere possibility" of injury) did not conform with 
the congressional desire to weed out nonmeritorious cases at an 
early stage of an investigation.104 
Considering that the CAFC had to work against the momen-
tum of a lower court decision invalidating the ITC's interpretation, 
the case might have been closer had the court applied a no defer-
ence standard of review in American Lamb. However, it is fair to 
state that the decision of the Court of International Trade was 
simply out of step with the wealth of legislative history supporting 
the ITC's interpretation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
If application of a "no deference even if sufficiently reasona-
ble" standard of review would not have changed the result in any 
of these three cases, why adopt such a standard? Indeed, the need 
for adoption of such a rule seems minimal because de facto, the 
Federal Circuit appears to be applying such a standard and merely 
paying lip service to the deference rule. As commentators are quick 
to point out, no matter how much deference is shown, a court 
never actually affirms an agency interpretation of a statutory pro-
vision without first independently analyzing it and its legislative 
history.106 If the court finds a conflict, it reverses under any stan-
dard of review.106 
A no deference standard of review ought to be formally 
adopted by the Federal Circuit if for no other reason than judicial 
candor, but several other more compelling reasons exist for doing 
so. First, adopting a "no deference even if sufficiently reasonable" 
standard of review would firmly establish the CAFC's status as the 
expert tribunal in the field of international trade law, a position it 
could rightfully claim, given its exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
103. See id. at 1003. 
104. Id. at 1001-02. 
105. PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 78, at 376-77; Woodward & Levin, supra 
note 78, at 332-35. 
106. See id. 
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over the subject area. As noted, 107 Congress has implicitly and ex-
pressly recognized this judicial expertise, most revealingly through 
the double-layered scheme of judicial review to which ITC anti-
dumping duty and countervailing duty determinations are 
subjected. 
A second reason for CAFC adoption of a no deference rule is 
that every antidumping duty determination reached by the ITC 
touches upon matters of international importance, because every 
such determination affects international trade between one or 
more other countries and the world's largest economic power. 
A third reason for explicitly rejecting the deference rule in 
CAFC review of either ITC or IT A statutory interpretations, is the 
in terrorem effect such a declaration would have on these agencies 
should they become emboldened by the deference rule to stray far 
afield of congressional intent. Adoption of a no deference standard 
of review would send a message to those agencies that they are not 
superior to courts in the interpretation of the antidumping duty 
statute while reaffirming that statutory interpretation is quintes-
sentially and ultimately a judicial, not an administrative, 
function. 108 
None of the foregoing should suggest that the ITC is unable or 
unwilling to take into account considerations of the public interest 
or that the Federal Circuit should exhibit an overweening attitude 
toward the Commission. Given the depth of expertise and the 
breadth of views brought to the Commission by the six commis-
sioners and staff, its views on the meaning of the U.S. trade laws 
should not be cavalierly rejected by the courts.109 At the same 
time, however, a panel of court of appeals judges who are them-
selves members of an expert Federal court, should not be daunted 
by the prospect of rejecting an ITC interpretation of the anti-
dumping duty law. Indeed, the CAFC should not hesitate to do so, 
even in cases where the court believes that the ITC's interpretation 
107. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
108. See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978) (where it is stated that the courts 
are "final authorities on issues of statutory construction"). 
109. The six ITC commissioners are appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, serve for a term of nine years, and must be qualified to develop 
expert knowledge of international trade matters. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a)-(b) (1982) . Not more 
than three of the commissioners may be members of the same political party. Id. § 1330(a). 
The Commission has the support of an expert staff of attorneys, economists, accountants, 
and statisticians. See Berg, Petitioning and Responding Under the Escape Clause: One 
Practitioner's View On How To Do It, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 407, 409 (1981) . 
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is reasonable, if the court would have reached a different conclu-
sion had the issue come before it initially in a judicial proceeding. 
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